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Louis B. Sohn*
First, I would like to say a few words about Professor Rusk and
his interest in the subject of intervention. For a long time he has
been interested in problems of peaceful change, both domestic and
international. I became especially cognizant of his interest some
twenty years ago when I was working at the State Department in
the Arms ControlAgency. I was trying to persuade them that you
cannot have arms control unless, at the same time, you can main-
tain peace and provide the proper means for peaceful change and
protecting human rights. So they said, "All right, you seem to
know about peaceful change, could you prepare a bibliography and
a short memo on the subject." I went to the State Department li-
brary and collected a number of books. In those simple days before
computers, they still had the system of putting on the back of each
book the name of the person who borrowed it. When I got the
books to my office, I happened to glance at the back of one of
them, and then, becoming interested, I looked at the others. Every
one of those books had previously been read by only one person in
the State Department, and that person was Dean Rusk.
Another recollection that I have is of introducing Dean Rusk to
the American Society of International Law in about 1963. I re-
member at that time citing a speech of his to the Foreign Press
Association, which, I think, still reflects his point of view on the
subject before us. He said that United States foreign policy has
four commitments: to the United Nations, to the growth of law
among nations, to economic and social betterment, and first of all,
to freedom. Those are his four guidelines and they have also been
mine to a very large extent, although I think I have deviated from
them more than he has. These are certainly good guidelines for
anyone who thinks about the future and a better world.
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The problem before us today is a difficult one. The League of
Nations became very conscious that many interventions by states
in the nineteenth century resulted from the fact that no entity
other than a state could intervene to protect persecuted people.
The minority treaties were, therefore, based on the principle that
the League of Nations itself would protect minorities. It was hoped
that League of Nations involvement might prevent the kind of
trouble that led to the Balkan Wars and the First World War.
Similarly, the United Nations quickly realized that in order to be
able to maintain peace, it had to substitute, as far as possible, in-
ternational intervention for national intervention, and it had to
deal with problems that were threatening the peace of the world,
even if they were domestic in nature. As you well know, article 2,
paragraph 7, of the Charter provides for the exception of domestic
jurisdiction,1 but the exception is subject to the power of the Se-
curity Council to intervene when necessary for the maintenance of
peace and security. This was, of course, the opening wedge for in-
ternational action in domestic problems.
At the same time, however, we had another problem. The re-
gional organizations, especially the Organization of American
States, thought that they could best maintain peace internationally
and domestically in their regions, and that therefore, the United
Nations should stay out. Several provisions in the Charter, which I
hope we will be discussing today, are relevant to the subject of the
division of power between the United Nations and the regional or-
ganizations. The question of division of power was revived with the
emergence of the Organization of African Unity and the many
problems that it faced.
The issue arose originally in the Americas. The first case oc-
curred in Guatemala, where in 1954 there was a conflict between
Arbenz and Castillo Armas, and a great difficulty developed con-
cerning the question of whether the United Nations or the Organi-
zation of American States should deal with the subject. The
Arbenz government collapsed before this question was solved. Soon
thereafter, Costa Rica was invaded from Nicaragua by Costa Rican
exiles. President Figueros immediately asked for the help of the
Organization of American States. On the Organization's request,
several countries sent planes for air supervision of the border and
that was sufficient to stop the infiltration. Consequently, the
U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 7.
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United Nations did not get involved in this case. We have also had
several problems concerning Cuba, particularly the Bay of Pigs in-
vasion and the Punta del Este decision by which Cuba was read
out of the Organization of American States. A few years later there
was a problem between Venezuela and the Dominican Republic.
The Dominican Republic was accused of intervening in the domes-
tic affairs of Venezuela. The most complicated case was that of the
Dominican Republic in 1965; American troops and, later, an inter-
American force, entered in order to maintain peace. Similarly, in
Africa we had the Congo, Biafra's attempt to secede from Nigeria,
and more recently, Chad. Some of these cases were dealt with by
the United Nations, others by the Organization of African Unity.
There have been, therefore, many instances in which the prob-
lem arose of how international organizations were going to deal
with problems of civil war. As a result of the Congo incident, many
books and articles have been written which provide various ways
for defining in which situations and by what means international
organizations can properly intervene in order to maintain peace.
One of the crucial issues in this connection is the interrelationship
between internal conflicts and the United Nations preventive ac-
tion to maintain human rights in a country, to help to ensure their
observance, and thereby to prevent the necessity for people to re-
bel. We need to remember that the preamble to the United Na-
tions Universal Declaration of Human Rights2 states that if the
rights recognized by the Declaration are constantly violated, peo-
ple have as the last resort the right to rebel against the oppressive
government, as was done by the American colonies when they re-
belled against the British government two centuries ago.
In view of all these problems, the United Nations has been try-
ing to do three different things. First, the United Nations had to
develop the basic principles of intervention. Most of them were
borrowed from the Charter of the Organization of American
States,' especially those on intervention, but they went much fur-
ther concerning the limitations on help to guerrillas and the
problems of interference by various means. The United Nations
Declaration on Friendly Relations,4 the Declaration on Inadmissi-
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71 (1948).
S Charter of the Organization of American States, done Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394,
T.I.A.S. No. 2361, 119 U.N.T.S. 3.
4 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-
operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 28) at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M.
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bility of Intervention,' and several other documents have been
broadening or clarifying the law on the subject over the last 20
years. Second, as noted previously, the United Nations has been
trying to resolve problems with the regional organizations concern-
ing the division of power between them and the United Nations.
Third, the United Nations has been trying, as mentioned before, to
take preventive action in some dangerous situations, in order to
provide better protection for human rights, and attempting to in-
tervene early enough to prevent an explosion. I must admit that,
concerning the third approach, the United Nations has been least
successful, and terrible things have happened as a result. In Ban-
gladesh, millions of refugees escaped to India from rigorous mili-
tary oppression and caused India ultimately to intervene militarily
to the great dismay of the United Nations. On the other hand,
there was great relief in United Nations circles that somebody
finally did something about the situation. As we mentioned yester-
day, there is always this double problem: first, you want to protect
human rights, and second, you do not want to intervene. At some
point, these two interests clash and one or the other prevails.
Finally, I want to mention that at this point the United Nations,
on the initiative of Jordan, has been asked to study the interna-
tional humanitarian order. At the last General Assembly meeting
the matter was discussed only slightly, but it was put on the
agenda of the future Assemblies. This is a very current and impor-
tant subject, and I hope that we get a bit enlightened about this
difficult problem today.
1292 (1970).
6 Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, 20 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 14) at 11, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1966), reprinted in 5 I.L.M. 374 (1966).
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